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Abstract 
 
The debate on the issue of child soldiers in international law has been mainly 
framed around the narrow question of whether child soldiers should be prosecuted or 
deemed innocent victims. This question, while essential, marginalized several 
considerations related to the multidimensional and intersecting identities and roles of child 
soldiers. Few scholars have investigated and evidenced the major gaps related to the legal 
protection of child soldiers in international law. While recognizing the potential related to 
the analysis on child soldiers’ criminal liability, this research proposes to focus on the 
examination of their vulnerabilities and to explore the legal foundations for the 
strengthening of their legal protection. 
 Thus, this project is not a mere recognition of child soldiers as innocent victims but 
a careful and extensive examination of several areas of Public International Law such as 
International Humanitarian Law, International Criminal Law and International Human 
Rights Law to justify the necessity to establish a stronger and exhaustive legal protection 
for child soldiers. Most importantly, this research illustrates the reason why child soldiers 
keep their status as children, despite their status or conduct during armed conflicts, and the 
ensuing consequences and impacts of such findings for the principle of distinction in 
International Humanitarian Law. 
 
Key words: child soldiers, direct participation, active participation, combatants, special 
protection, principle of distinction. 
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Introduction 
  
 Children are impacted in various ways and at multiple levels during armed 
conflicts: some are killed, maimed, abducted to become soldiers or sexually abused, 
whereas others are psychologically exploited.” 1 This Major Research Project (MRP) 
acknowledges that children are not only passive victims in armed conflicts, but that some 
of them can display “tactical agency to cope with the concrete, immediate conditions of 
their lives created by their violent military environment.”2 
 Nevertheless, the main focus of this paper will be on the vulnerabilities of child 
soldiers and on the need to improve their legal protection during armed conflicts. As 
Drumbl notes, while “it seems fundamentally unfounded to stereotype all child soldiers as 
depersonalized tools of atrocity or as weapons systems industrially committing crimes 
against humanity”, it can no longer be seriously disputed that “where there is armed 
conflict, invariably, there are child soldiers.”3 The 2016 International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Policy on Children has recognized that “children are present, both in armed forces of states 
and in non-state armed groups.”4 
Despite the impossibility of assessing with precision the exact number of children 
recruited or used by armed groups or armed forces, there is a consistent use of the figure 
of 300,000 child soldiers both by humanitarian organizations, researchers and by 
                                                     
1 Secretary-General, Promotion and protection of the rights of children: impact of armed conflict on 
children, GA, 51st session, 1996, A/51/306 at 4 [Graça Machel Report]. 
2 Alcinda Honwana, Child soldiers in Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006) at 71. 
3 Mark Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012) at 85, 26. 
4 International Criminal Court, “Policy on Children” (November 2016), The office of the Prosecutor at 20, 
online: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/20161115_OTP_ICC_Policy-on-Children_Eng.PDF>.  
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academics as being the most authoritative and accurate number on child soldiers.5 Armed 
groups or governmental forces often prefer recruiting or abducting children because they 
are easier to manipulate and to control than adults.6 In his article entitled “Generic 
guidelines for the use of force against ‘child soldiers’ in peace operations”, Lieutenant 
Colonel Leandro highlights that “children eat less, drink less, are not paid, serve as pack 
animals, are able to cook, can collect wood without drawing attention”, and that they 
normally have no next of kin to worry about them and consequently are replaceable and 
disposable.”7 Unsurprisingly, all these reasons make children extremely coveted in the eye 
of belligerents. The Canadian Forces Joint Doctrine Note (Canadian Forces JDN) 
highlights that in certain areas children “form the majority of forces.”8 
 In 2005, the United Nations’ Secretary-General identified six grave violations that 
are committed against children. These violations are entrenched in the main legal 
instruments in International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law 
(IHRL), and International Criminal Law (ICL), and they are listed as follows9: 
1. Recruitment and use of children 
2. Killing or maiming of children 
3. Sexual violence against children 
4. Attacks against schools or hospitals 
5. Abduction of children 
                                                     
5 Gus Waschefort, International Law and Child Soldiers, (Oxford: Hart publishing, 2015) at 26-27; 
Drumbl, supra note 3 at 27. 
6Ibid at 47; Prosecutor v Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, Decision on the confirmation of charges 
against Dominic Ongwen (23 March 2016), at para 142 (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber 
II), online: ICC <https://www.icc-cpi.int/courtrecords/CR2016_02331.PDF>. [Ongwen] 
7 Francisco José Bernardino da Silva Leandro, “Generic guidelines for the use of force against “child 
soldiers” in Peace Operations”, online: (2012) Revista Militar 2523, 
<https://www.revistamilitar.pt/artigopdf/687>. 
8 Canada, Minister of National Defence, Canadian Forces Joint Doctrine Note, 1st edition, (2017-01 Child 
Soldiers) at 6, <http://dtic.mil/doctrine/notes/doctrine_notes.htm> [Canadian Forces JDN]. 
9 Office of the special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed conflicts, The six 
grave violations against children during armed conflict: the legal foundation, Working paper n°1,October 
2009 (updated November 2013) at 9, 
<http://www.tonyhoffmanucsc.net/caw_readings/SixGraveViolations.pdf> [Working paper updated 2013]. 
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6. Denial of humanitarian access.10 
 
 This MRP will focus on the first grave violation related to the prohibition against 
the recruitment or use of children under fifteen to participate in hostilities. The analysis 
around this violation will highlight a disconnect between the international discourse on the 
prohibition against the recruitment and use of child soldiers and the continuing practice of 
child soldiering. This MRP will stress some gaps that exist as to child soldiers’ legal 
protection during armed conflicts under IHL and ICL, while pointing out to the potential 
contribution of IHRL and military guidelines in the design of a stronger legal framework 
on child soldiers. 
 Through a multidimensional analysis combining IHL, ICL and IHRL, this research 
project will present two major arguments. First, it will argue that children under fifteen 
years old enjoy a special status in international law that is visible both through the 
established legal framework on the prohibition of children’s recruitment or use in hostilities 
and through their specific status during armed conflicts, particularly their ‘special 
protection’ under IHL. As it will be explained later, the special protection is an extended 
protective legal regime that applies to a specific category of the population deemed 
vulnerable during armed conflicts such as children under fifteen years and expectant 
mothers.11 
                                                     
10 Ibid.  
11 International Committee for the Red Cross, “special protection of women and children” (October 1985), 
online:<https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jmj2.htm>; Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, art 77(3) [AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, art 4(3) [AP II];Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, arts 23, 24, 38(5), 50) 
(GCIV). 
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 Second, this MRP will highlight that neither the terms ‘direct’ nor ‘active’ 
participation (used respectively by IHL and ICL) properly capture the status of child 
soldiers. This MRP will argue that child soldiers should neither be treated as regular 
combatants or as civilians who are unlawfully participating in hostilities (unlawful 
combatants). Rather, they should be considered as child victims whose participation to 
hostilities is neither based “on free will aimed at a certain result” or “a conscious act of 
engaging in conduct of a given nature.”12 In other words, this paper will argue that 
children’s status during armed conflicts challenges the traditional IHL principle of 
distinction and requires a new legal framework to better protect them.  
 This MRP will be structured into three main parts. The first part will explain some 
basic and established principles in international law on children’s protection during armed 
conflicts. First, it will discuss the definition of a child soldier and will situate the blanket 
prohibition of children’s recruitment both in international law (hard law) and soft law. This 
section will emphasize the scope and extent of the prohibition to recruit or use children in 
hostilities and will conclude that such prohibition is not only widely entrenched in 
international law, but most importantly, it has crystallised into customary international law 
(CIL). 
 In the second part, this paper will lay out the underpinnings of children’s special 
protection in IHL and will emphasize that such protection applies to all children under 
fifteen years, regardless of their conduct or status in hostilities. To that extent, this MRP 
will distinguish between ‘direct’ and ‘active’ participation in IHL’s and ICL’s legal 
framework, while pointing out to inconsistencies and confusions in the understanding of 
                                                     
12 Leandro, supra note7 at 3. 
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these terms. To explore these two notions, this project will explain and compare the 
respective definitions adopted by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) 
and the ICC. Then, a literature review will be conducted to compare the various 
perspectives adopted by scholars in order to contrast and challenge the ICRC’s and the 
ICC’s views on ‘active’ and ‘direct’ participation. 
 In the last part, this MRP will highlight the merits of a multidimensional framework 
on the understanding of the scope of children’s protection during armed conflicts in 
international law. In doing so, the project will point out some key principles from military 
guidelines that armed groups and forces need to consider when there is a risk to encounter 
child soldiers on the battlefield. In this section, the MRP will mainly rely on the Canadian 
Forces Joint Doctrine (JDN). This section will also clarify that, although child soldiers may 
be targeted when they constitute a threat for opposing force, the use of force (lethal or non-
lethal) against them should always be the last option. 
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Chapter 1: Uncovering children’s special status during armed conflict 
in international law 
 
1. International legal framework on child soldiers 
 Initially designed as a mechanism to foster political relations between sovereign 
states, public international law did not question, prohibit or codify the phenomenon of child 
soldiering until 1977, despite the numerous evidence of such practice.13 Waschefort points 
out that “there are many accounts in history, theology and mythology of children’s heroism 
in battle”, and that despite the substantial number of children who were engaged in 
hostilities during the Second World War, “the Geneva Conventions of 1949 did not prohibit 
the recruitment and participation of children in armed conflict.”14 Therefore, in 1977, IHL 
became the first area of international law that addressed the issue of child soldiers through 
the first two Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions (AP I & II).15 
1.1 Lack of an authoritative and binding definition of a child soldier 
 The issue of child soldiers is multifaceted and has been treated from various angles 
by a plethora of actors. Waschefort notes that “at present there are at least eight 
international treaties prohibiting the use and recruitment of child soldiers”, and that “the 
obligations created by each of these treaties are different from one another.”16 In addition 
to such diversity, he notes that “different states have ratified different combinations of these 
treaties, further complicating the assessment of the exact nature of the legal obligations to 
                                                     
13 Waschefort, supra note 5 at 1. 
14 Ibid. 
15 AP I, supra note 11; AP II, supra note 11. 
16 Wachefort, supra note 5 at 13 
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which a state may be subject vis-à-vis a specific child in a concrete case.”17 For instance, 
AP I and II have prohibited the recruitment or use of children under fifteen years18, whereas 
the Optional Protocol to the CRC has raised the standard by prohibiting such practice for 
all children under eighteen years.19 This lack of uniformity not only blurs states’ legal 
obligations towards child soldiers, but it also hampers the development of a comprehensive 
legal protection for children living in conflict zones. 
 In addition, despite its prohibition to recruit or use children in hostilities since 1977, 
international law has never been able to codify an authoritative definition of a child 
soldier.20 Eisentrager asserts that “the lack of laws and regulations prohibiting child-
soldiering may have been a contributing factor to the recruitment and use of children in 
armed conflict”, since “states have been very eager to secure their own interests, rather the 
interests of underage individuals participating in hostilities.”21 Unsurprisingly, the absence 
of an early established legal framework on the issue of child soldiers prevented the 
subsequent development of a consistent definition and approach. This research project 
posits that such a lacuna is problematic because it offers little protection to children while 
failing to provide a complete and uniform legal basis to courts, states, armed groups and 
advocates confronted with this issue at policy, decision-making or operational levels. 
                                                     
17 Waschefort, supra note 5 at 13-14. 
18 AP I posits the possibility to recruit children who are fifteen years and older: “In recruiting among those 
persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, the 
Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.” (API, supra note 11 art 
77(2)). 
19Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed 
conflict, 25 May 2000, A/RES/54/263, arts 1 & 2 (entered into force 12 February 2002) [Optional Protocol 
to the CRC]. 
20 The Canadian Forces JDN points out that “there is no consistent universally recognized definition of a 
child soldier” (Canadian Forces JDN, supra note 8 at 1-3). 
21 Stian Eisentrager, “Exploring the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers” (19 April 2012) online: 
<http://www.e-ir.info/2012/04/19/exploring-the-recruitment-and-use-of-child-soldiers/>.  
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Moreover, this project argues that since some actors may have adopted various and 
conflicting positions with respect to children’s protection and participation in hostilities, 
this complicates further developments of the law. 
 Despite the failure of international law to define what is a child soldier, soft law22 
has provided some guidance on this concept by explicating the characteristics of a child 
soldier and the roles or functions attributed to such position. As a matter of fact, the issue 
on child soldiers started to become a major theme in international politics thanks to the 
release of the ground-breaking report of Graça Machel in 1996.23 This report examined the 
impact of armed conflicts on children in several countries affected by armed conflicts such 
as Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and 
some refugee camps in the former Zaire and Tanzania, and various locations in the former 
Yugoslavia.24 
 In 1997, during an international conference held in South Africa on the “prevention 
of child recruitment”, the Cape Town Principles were adopted.25 This conference was 
aimed at developing “strategies for preventing recruitment of children, demobilising child 
soldiers and helping them to reintegrate into society.”26 The Cape Town Principles clarified 
                                                     
22 Soft law refers to “the principles of a political, practical, humanitarian, or moral nature that can influence 
state behaviour, but that do not, strictly speaking, correspond to extant legal obligations or rights” (John 
Currie et al., International Law: Doctrine, Practice and Theory, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014), at 
151).  
23 Graça Machel is the “first post-independence” Minister of Education of Mozambique. In 1993, she was 
appointed by the former UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Gali as a UN expert to investigate the 
conditions and the impact of children during armed conflicts which triggered increase attention on the issue 
of child soldiering (UNICEF, “Impact of armed conflict on children” online: 
<https://www.unicef.org/graca/graca.htm>.  
24 Graça Machel Report, supra note 1 at 7. 
25 UNICEF, Cape Town Principles, 27-30 October 1997, 
<https://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles%281%29.pdf> [Cape Town Principles]. 
26 UNICEF, Paris Principles: Principles and guidelines associated with armed forces or armed groups, 
February 2007, at 1.2 < https://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf> [Paris 
Principles].  
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for the first time that a “child soldier” does not only refer to “a child who is carrying or has 
carried arms, but also “any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular 
or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, 
porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups.”27 The Cape Town Principles 
asserted that “girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage” are also covered 
by the definition of child soldiers.28 Most importantly, this instrument posited that “child 
soldiers retain their rights as children.”29 This constitutes an unprecedented recognition and 
a clear confirmation that children’s participation to warfare does not eliminate their status 
and the special protection that they are entitled to as children. Unsurprisingly, the Cape 
Town Principles have informed and influenced the “development of international norms as 
well as shifts in policy at the national, regional and international levels.”30 
 A decade later, a new instrument, the Paris Principles, were adopted in 2007 as 
part of a global review of the Cape Town Principles.31 This instrument coined the term 
“children associated with armed forces or armed groups”, which refers to “any person 
below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed 
group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, 
cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes.”32 This definition does not only 
refer to a “child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities” since it is aimed at 
emphasizing the multiple ways in which children become involved in armed conflicts.33 
                                                     
27 Cape Town Principles, supra note 25 at annex. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid at 7. 
30 Paris Principles, supra note 26 at 1.2.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid at 2.1.  
33 Ibid. 
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 Unfortunately, the more public the issue on child soldiers became the narrower it 
was treated. 34 As a matter of fact, child soldiers were often treated by media and 
international politics as being only those serving at the frontlines, which dissimulated all 
child soldiers assigned to indirect and often invisible support functions.35 Leibig points out 
that the major drawback of such approach is that “the issue becomes oversimplified and 
subgroups are marginalized.”36 
 This MRP agrees with the definitions posited by the Cape Town Principles and the 
Paris Principles which are very similar and are based on the same foundations. Both 
definitions have rightly clarified that the concept of child soldiers cannot only be limited 
to military operations or to direct participation in hostilities because the roles played by 
children during armed conflicts are diverse and intersecting. Although they are not legally 
binding, both the Cape Town Principles and the Paris Principles have succeeded in their 
delimitation of the complexity related to the issue of child soldiering. 
  By contrast, as it will be discussed in chapter 2, legal treaties such as AP I, AP II, 
and the Rome Statute have focused on a specific kind of participation (direct or active 
participation), thus creating a superficial and narrow distinction as to the status and legal 
protection of children affected by armed conflicts. According to Waschefort, “the concept 
of ‘child soldier’ can reasonably be interpreted as being broader than any of the relevant 
treaty norms or customary rules in existence.”37 This assertion clearly warns against the 
negative tendency of hard law to codify in a narrow perspective social phenomenon such 
                                                     
34 Abigail Leibig, “Girl Child Soldiers in Northern Uganda: Do Current Legal Frameworks Offer Sufficient 
Protection?” online: (2005) 3:1 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 6 
<http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=njihr>. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Leibig, supra note 34 at para 5. 
37 Waschefort, supra note 5 at 15. 
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as child soldiering. Therefore, the concept of child soldiers is still filled with confusions 
despite the non-binding guidance from soft law. 
 In the next section, this MRP will highlight the difficulties raised by the narrow 
approaches adopted by IHL and ICL as to the prohibition of children’s participation in 
hostilities in international law. 
1.2 The prohibition of children’s recruitment or use in hostilities 
 No discussion on the issue of child soldiers would be complete without an 
introduction to the core principles of IHL on the conduct of hostilities. A clear 
understanding of such principles will help grasp the problematic on the prohibition of 
children’s recruitment or use in international law. In addition, such examination is 
important because it allows, on the one hand, for an analysis of the law related to the 
practice of recruiting or using children under a certain age and, on the other hand for 
clarification of the legal considerations that should be afforded to the consequences derived 
from this practice. 
 IHL is the first and only area of international law entirely designed around the 
conduct of hostilities. It balances military necessity, which gives belligerents the freedom 
to conduct hostilities in order to defeat the adversary, against the principle of humanity or 
humane treatment, which imposes “certain limits on the means and methods of warfare, 
and requires that those who have fallen into enemy hands be treated humanely at all time.”38 
According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principle of humane treatment is 
                                                     
38 Nils Melzer and Etienne Kuster, “International Humanitarian Law, A Comprehensive introduction”, 
(ICRC, 2016) at 17-18, <http://icrcndresourcecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/4231_002-
IHL_WEB_133.pdf >; Nils Melzer, “Interpretive guidance on the notion of Direct Participation in 
hostilities in IHL”, (ICRC, 2009) at 11 <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf >. 
[ICRC Interpretive Guidance]. 
12 
 
a “minimum yardstick” which expresses “elementary considerations of humanity that must 
be regarded as binding in any armed conflict, regardless of treaty obligation.”39 However, 
this principle applies only to “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de 
combat’.”40 This rule contained in all four Geneva Conventions constitutes “the basic 
minimum standards of international humanitarian law applicable in conflict situations.”41 
 IHL’s balancing finds its justification through the cardinal principle of distinction 
between combatants and civilians. This principle recognizes that civilians “enjoy immunity 
from direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”, whereas 
combatants “have the privilege under the laws of war to use force offensively without the 
threat of criminal liability”, as long as they respect IHL’s core principles.42 Therefore, one 
of IHL’s aims is “to shield those who are not directly participating in the conflict from its 
effects”, while allowing belligerents to wage war and to use tactics that do not violate the 
laws of war.43 As it will be illustrated later, this traditional principle of distinction between 
                                                     
39 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), [1986] ICJ Rep 14 at para 218; Melzer and Kuster supra note 28 at 256. 
40 Common Article 3(1) to: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N. T.S. 31 [GC I]; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the 
Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N. T.S. 85 [GC II];; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N. T.S. 135 [GC III]; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [GC IV]. 
41 ICRC, “Non-International Armed conflict”, Unit for relations with Armed and Security Forces, (June 
2002) at 5 <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/law10_final.pdf>. 
42 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 38 at 20; Charles P. Trumbull IV, “Re-thinking the principle of 
proportionality” online: (2015) 55:3 Virginia Journal of International at 351 
<http://www.vjil.org/assets/pdfs/vol55/VJIL_55.3_Trumbull_FINAL.pdf>.  
43 Michael N. Schmitt, “The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare”, online: (2014) 2:1 Yale 
Human Rights and Development Journal (1999) at 145 
<http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context=yhrdlj>.  
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combatants and civilians is challenged both by the special protection owed to children, 
their lack of legal capacity and by their status under IHRL. 
 AP I and II were the first international legal instruments to prohibit the recruitment 
or use of child soldiers in armed conflicts.44 AP I regulates international armed conflicts 
(IACs), whereas AP II focuses on non-international armed conflicts (NIACs).45 Both 
instruments proscribe in categorical terms the recruitment or use of children under 15 years 
old by armed groups or armed forces as illustrated below: 
 Art 77 (3) AP 1 
The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have 
not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, 
they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting among those 
persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of 
eighteen years, the Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to give priority to those who are 
oldest. 
 
Art 4 (3) AP 2 
3. Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particular: 
c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the 
armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities.46[emphasis added] 
 
 These strict prohibitions have been extensively reproduced and developed in 
several legal regimes of international law throughout times. For instance, IHRL has 
respectively in 1989 and 1999, through the Convention on the rights of the child (CRC) 
and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), urged state 
members to “take all feasible measures” (CRC) and “all necessary measures” (ACRWC) 
to ensure that children under fifteen years old (CRC) and no children under eighteen years 
                                                     
44 Joshua Yuvaraj, “When does a child participate actively in hostilities under the Rome statute? Protecting 
children from use in hostilities after Lubanga” online: (2016) 32:83 Utrecht Journal of International and 
European Law at 71 <http://www.utrechtjournal.org/articles/10.5334/ujiel.321/galley/151/download/>. 
45 AP I, supra note 11; AP II, supra note 11. IACs refers to hostilities between states, whereas NIACs are 
characterized by hostilities between states on one side or non-state actors on both sides (Meltzer & Kuster, 
supra note 8 at 53). 
46 AP 1, supra note 11, art77 (3); AP2, supra note 11, art 4 (3).  
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old (ACRWC) have been recruited or participated directly in hostilities.47 Moreover, in 
2000, Optional Protocol to the CRC was adopted to raise the minimum age for recruitment 
or participation in hostilities to18 years old.48 Similarly, in 1998 and 2002, ICL, through 
the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) and the Statute for the 
Special Court of Sierra Leone (SSCSL), declared that “conscripting or enlisting children 
under the age of fifteen years […] or using them to participate actively in hostilities” was 
a war crime and a serious violation of IHL.49 
 This research project argues that the lack of uniformity in the law as to the age limit 
for the prohibition of children’s recruitment or use in hostilities (15 years vs 18 years) is 
based on “societal constructs of age and corresponding social roles”, instead of being 
grounded upon scientific and “psychiatric developmental data.”50 This MRP recognizes 
that the fifteen years old cut-off is a superficial and arbitrary age-limit which should be at 
least extended to 18 years to match the CRC’s default age of majority. Indeed, its Article 
1 defines a child as “every human being below the age of eighteen unless under the law 
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.51 
 However, even such delimitation would still constitute a controversial 
determination in some societies such as African societies where “childhood does not 
correspond to the globally accepted age limit of under-18 years, but is largely influenced 
                                                     
47 Convention on the rights of the child, 20 November 1989, A/RES/54/263, art 38 (entered into force 12 
February 2002) [CRC]; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 11 June 1990, 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49, art 22 (entered into force 2 September 1990) [ACRWC]. 
48 Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra note 19, arts 1-4. 
49 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, A/CONF.183/9 arts 8(2)(b)(xvii), (e)(vii) 
[Rome Statute]; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, art 4(c) (entered into force 
on 12 April 2002, pursuant Security Council resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000) [SSCSL].  
50 Ibid at 49. 
51 CRC, supra note 47, art 1. 
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by traditional socio-cultural and even economic contexts.”52 Unfortunately, the discussion 
on what constitutes the appropriate age limit for children’s participation is beyond the 
scope of this MRP. Moreover, ICL and IHL, which are the main focus of this project have 
both maintained the status quo for children’s protection at fifteen years, which justifies the 
focus on children under fifteen years in this MRP.53 
 In 1999, the International Labour Organization (ILO) went a step further than the 
previously mentioned instruments by positing in its Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention (ILO N°182 ) that “forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in 
armed conflict” is a practice similar to slavery.54 As it will be explained later, this 
declaration constitutes a strong and unprecedented assertion in international law. To that 
extent, this MRP reminds that slavery is a jus cogens norm in international law which refers 
to peremptory norms that are “prohibited at all times, both in times of peace and during 
armed conflicts, and against all persons, irrespective of any legal status.”55 
 The prohibition against slavery also features an erga omnes obligation which 
triggers a legal interest from all states to protect.56 Therefore, comparing the practice of 
child soldiering to both a jus cogens norm and an erga omnes obligation is highly indicative 
                                                     
52 Dr W Andy Knight, “Children and War: Impact, Protection and Rehabilitation” (January 2006), 
University of Alberta (faculty of arts), online: 
<http://www.artsrn.ualberta.ca/childrenandwar/papers/Children_and_War_Phase_II_Report.pdf>.  
53 Any reference to ‘children’ without further details in this MRP will always refer to children under fifteen 
years. 
54Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 17 June 1999, International Labour Organization art 3(a) 
(Entry into force 19 November 2000) [ILO N° 182]. 
55The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, (Second decision on the Defence’s challenge to the 
jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9) (4 January 2017) at para 52 (International criminal 
Court, Trial Chamber VI), <https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_00011.PDF> [Ntaganda]; 
Currie, supra note 22 at 155. 
56Ibid. 
16 
 
of the seriousness and severity of such crime in international law.57 The Worst Forms of 
Child Labour Convention (ILO N°182) is a core treaty among ILO fundamental 
instruments and is meant to address the ILO’s objectives on the effective abolition of child 
labour.58 
 Interestingly, in 2004, the Special Court for Sierra Leone was asked in the 
Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman to pinpoint the moment at which the prohibition against 
children’s recruitment and use in hostilities became part of customary international law.59 
The Court examined state practice and opinio juris relating to child recruitment, and 
confirmed that “[p]rior to November 1996, the prohibition on child recruitment had […] 
crystallised as customary international law.”60 This conclusion was supported, on the one 
hand, by the numerous occurrences of domestic legislation which illustrated that “almost 
all states prohibit (and have done so for a long time) the recruitment of children under the 
age of 15.”61 
 Moreover, the Court examined the ratification of legal instruments prohibiting such 
crimes, and concluded that the “widespread recognition and acceptance of the norm 
prohibiting child recruitment in Additional Protocol II and the CRC provides compelling 
evidence that the conventional norm entered customary international law well before 
                                                     
57 Alexandre Andrade Sampaio, Matthew McEvoy, “Little weapons of war: reasons for and consequences 
of treating child soldiers as victims”, online : (2016) 63 :1 Netherlands International Law Review at 62-63 
< https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40802-016-0054-1>. 
58 ILO, “the International Labour Organization’s Fundamental Conventions”, (2005) at 7, online: 
<http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
declaration/documents/publication/wcms_095895.pdf>.  
59 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on 
Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment) (31 May 2004) at paras 17-23 (Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
Appeals Chamber), <http://www.sierralii.org/sl/judgment/special-court/2004/18>. 
60 Ibid at para 17. 
61 Ibid at para 18. 
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1996.”62 Finally, the Court clarified that despite some variations in the wording of the 
prohibitions articulated by AP I on IACs and AP II on NIACs, “children are protected by 
the fundamental guarantees, regardless of whether there is an international or internal 
conflict taking place.”63 This conclusion was reaffirmed in 2009 and in 2013 by the Office 
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in 
its Working Paper on the “The Six Grave Violations Against Children During Armed 
Conflict.”64 Thus, since the prohibition of the recruitment or use of children under fifteen 
years to participate in hostilities is widely entrenched in international law and has also 
crystalized into customary international law, this MRP argues that it “can be enforced 
against all parties to a conflict”, and that it is aimed at proscribing all kinds of children’s 
participation in armed conflicts.65 
1.3 Recognizing children’s vulnerabilities through the special protection 
 The Canadian Forces JDN on child soldiers highlights that “vulnerable populations 
are those individuals or groups who have a greater probability than the population as a 
whole of being harmed and experiencing an impaired quality of life because of social, 
environmental, health or economic conditions or policies.”66 Kuper argues that children’s 
vulnerability is visible through many signs of child soldiering. For instance, she notes that 
                                                     
62 Ibid at para 20. 
63 Ibid at para 18. 
64 Working paper updated 2013 supra note 9 at 11; Office of the special Representative of the Secretary 
General for Children and Armed conflicts, The six grave violations against children during armed conflict: 
the legal foundation, Working paper n°1, October 2009 at 4, 
https://www.crin.org/en/docs/SixGraveViolationspaper.pdf [Working paper 2009]. 
65 Shannon Bosch, “Targeting and prosecuting ‘under-aged’ child soldiers in international armed conflicts, 
in light of the IHL prohibition against civilian participation in hostilities”, online: (2012) 43:3 The 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa at 336, 
<https://journals.co.za/content/cilsa/45/3/EJC133834>; In this MRP, belligerents or ‘all parties’ during 
armed conflicts refers to both armed groups (rebel or militia groups) and armed forces (governmental 
army). 
66 Canadian Forces JDN, supra note 8 at 1-1. 
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usually when children participate in armed conflicts, “they operate with little or no training 
and are often fed with a diet of alcohol and drugs”67 
 Unsurprisingly, the Declaration of the rights of the child posited that “the child, by 
reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including 
appropriate legal protection.”68 Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
declared that “motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance.”69 
Consequently, children have been placed in the most vulnerable category of the population, 
and have been granted more legal protections than adults both in domestic and international 
law as a result of their vulnerabilities, “particularly in time of armed conflict.”70 Therefore, 
Kuper points out that children are entitled to a special treatment which grant them 
“additional assistance and protection.”71 Similarly, Cohn and Goodwill-Gill support that 
“in recognition of their particular needs and vulnerability, children benefit from specific 
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, so-called special protection.”72 
 Interestingly, the ‘special protection’ is not only found in the GC IV but also in AP 
I and II. The provisions of GC IV, which protect civilians “not taking active part in 
hostilities”, relate mainly to children’s basic needs such as “the provision of food, clothing 
and tonics, care of children who are orphaned or separated from their families, treatment 
                                                     
67 Jenny Kuper, Military training and children in armed conflict: Law, policy and Practice, (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) at 259. 
68 Declaration of the rights of the child, 20 November 1959, A/RES/14/1386, preamble (Proclaimed by 
General Assembly Resolution 1386(XIV)). 
69 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217 A (III) UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp N° 13, UN Doc 
A/810 (1948), art 25(2). 
70 Sandesh Sivakumaran, The law of non-international armed conflict, 1st ed (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012) at 315. 
71 Kuper, supra note 67 at 263. 
72 Ilene Cohn & Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Child soldiers: The Role of Children in armed Conflict, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994) at 122. 
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during deprivation of liberty and the distribution of relief consignments.”73 Such protection 
is in line with IHL’s principle of distinction, which is aimed at protecting those who are 
not directly involved in hostilities from direct attacks. 
 However, this protection was extended to children who take a direct part in 
hostilities through AP I and II. Indeed, AP I posits that children who take a direct part in 
hostilities “shall continue to benefit from the special protection”, “whether or not they are 
prisoners of war”, whereas AP II highlights that “the special protection […] remains 
applicable” to children under fifteen years “if they take a direct part in hostilities […] and 
are captured.”74 Therefore, under AP I belligerents are reminded that “children shall be the 
object of special respect and shall be protected against any form of indecent assault”, 
whereas AP II urges parties to provide children “with the care and aid they require.”75 
Moreover, AP I emphasizes that when “arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to 
the armed conflict”, these children “shall be held in quarters separate from the quarters of 
adults.”76 Similarly, both AP I and II strictly prohibit the death penalty against any person 
who was under 18 years at the time the offence was committed, even if this crime is related 
to acts committed during the armed conflict.77 
 Extending the special protection to children who are directly participating in 
hostilities is positively surprising and unexpected given IHL’s traditional perspective. As 
mentioned earlier, IHL is based on the inherent distinction between actors who are 
                                                     
73 GC IV, supra note 11 arts 14, 23, 24, 38, 50, 76, 89; ICRC, “Customary IHL: Rule 135”, (2017) online: 
<https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule135>.  
74 AP I supra note 11 art 77(3). 
75 AP I supra note 11 art 77; AP 2 supra note 11 art 4(3). 
76 AP I supra note 11 art 77(4). 
77 AP I supra note 11 77(5), AP II supra note 11 art 6(4). ICL seems to have embraced the spirit of this 
principle by refusing to prosecute individuals who were under 18 years at the time “of the alleged 
commission of the crime” (Rome Statute, supra note 49, art 26). 
20 
 
participating in hostilities (combatants) and thus, who are not protected from direct attack, 
and actors who are not participating in warfare (civilians) and, consequently who are 
protected from such attacks.78 Both categories were traditionally kept distinct and separate 
in terms of rights and obligations under IHL.79 Van Bueren supports that “the majority of 
children become caught up in armed conflicts as civilians”, and that all of them they suffer 
from direct and indirect consequences of war.80 Consequently, this research project posits 
that such extended protection to child soldiers is justified. 
 Therefore, the fact that two distinct categories of actors under IHL (child civilians 
and child direct participants in hostilities) benefit from the same protection stresses that 
what they share (childhood, vulnerabilities, immaturity) is given more weight than what 
sets them apart (their conduct or status in hostilities). This MRP argues that the special 
protection granted to children under fifteen years refers to an exceptional and broad legal 
regime aimed at offering the best legal protection to children whether they are participating 
in hostilities or not. 
 Furthermore, this project states that such protection is based on children’s 
acknowledged vulnerabilities, their legal incapacity and their lower maturity, instead of 
being derived from their conduct (direct participation) or their status (combatant) in 
hostilities. Unsurprisingly, such protection means that children’s presence on the battlefield 
will justify the application of stricter rules of conduct and, as will be discussed in chapter 2, 
                                                     
78 Melzer and Kuster, supra note 38 at 83-84. 
79 Sassòli, Marco, Bouvier, Antoine A& Quintin, Anne, How does law protect in war: Cases, Documents 
and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law, (Geneva: ICRC, 
2006), chapter 5, “The Fundamental Distinction Between Civilians and Combatants”, at 1-2. 
80 Geraldine Van Bueren, “The international legal protection of children in armed conflict”, online: (1994) 
43:4 International and Comparative Law Quarterly at 817 
<https://journals.scholarsportal.info/details/00205893/v43i0004/809_tilpociac.xml >. 
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will require additional assessments from opposing armed forces or groups before any 
attack. 
 Thus, it is clear that the principles contained in the special protection call for higher 
standards of protection while advocating for a differentiated treatment towards children. 
Moreover, the fact that the special protection does not explicitly protect child soldiers from 
being targeted does not make the study of their legal protection irrelevant. Rather, the 
understanding of this legal regime which applies to all children can help both lawmakers 
and belligerents to adapt approach towards child soldiers. 
Conclusion 
 This first chapter has presented the legal framework on child soldiers by 
highlighting, on the one hand, a lack of an authoritative and binding definition for the term 
‘child soldier’, while pointing out to some issues resulting from this gap in international 
law. Moreover, this chapter has referred to the essential guidance provided by soft law 
through three documents, namely the Graça Machel report, the Cape Town Principles and 
the Paris Principles. These instruments clarified that a child soldier is not only a child who 
is participating in military operations contrary to the narrow understanding of hard law 
under IHL and ICL. Rather, soft law posited that a child soldier refers to a wide range of 
roles and functions undertaken by children during hostilities for the advantage of armed 
groups or forces. 
 After laying down the foundational elements of the term ‘child soldier’, this chapter 
discussed the codification of the prohibition against the recruitment or use of children in 
hostilities in several areas of international law. To that extent, this chapter illustrated that 
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such prohibition has crystallized into customary international law and that it constitutes a 
highly-prohibited act under international law. 
 Finally, chapter 1 concluded its analysis by paying a closer attention to the concept 
of the special protection which has been granted to both children civilians and child 
soldiers. This MRP argued that granting the same protection to child civilians and to 
children who are involved in hostilities is a justifiable departure from the traditional IHL’s 
principle of distinction since IHL has traditionally kept the rights and obligations of both 
categories separate and somehow opposed. Such deviation is a clear sign from IHL that 
calls for a special treatment for children who are affected by armed conflicts. Thus, as 
mentioned earlier, the special protection, applies to all children under fifteen whether or 
not they are participating in hostilities. 
 The next chapter will distinguish between ‘direct’ and ‘active’ participation through 
a dialogue between IHL and ICL. This chapter will present and compare the conflicting 
and narrow approaches adopted by the ICC and the ICRC.81 Moreover, these approaches 
will be further explored through a literature review which will compare these approaches 
with other positions adopted by scholars or courts as to the concepts of ‘direct’ or ‘active’ 
participation in hostilities. This chapter will argue that both the ICC and the ICRC have 
failed to properly define the legal status of child soldiers by adopting ambiguous and 
opposed approaches. 
                                                     
81 The ICC is the only permanent international criminal court. It has the jurisdiction to prosecute the “most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community” and constitutes a major source of ICL. (Rome 
Statute, supra note 49, preamble). The ICRC is the only international humanitarian organization which was 
explicitly named and mandated under the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and thus, represents an authoritative 
source of IHL. (Melzer & Kuster, supra note 38 at 313). 
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 A multidimensional analysis, which incorporates IHRL principles will be 
conducted to highlight their potential contributions on the designing of an effective legal 
framework on the protection of child soldiers. 
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Chapter 2: Investigating a multidimensional scope for child soldiers’ 
legal protection 
 
2. Combining IHL, ICL and IHRL 
 Adopting a multidimensional scope for the study of the legal protection of child 
soldiers is not only necessary but also pressing because the problematic on child soldiering 
cannot be effectively analyzed and remedied by only focusing on a single area of law.82 
Interestingly, Buck clarifies that “children’s rights can be properly understood only in the 
context of the wider human rights framework.”83 Likewise, Waschefort notes that “today, 
international human rights law (IHRL) and international criminal law (ICL) are as 
important to the prohibition of child soldiering as IHL.”84 Furthermore, he posits that “in 
taking an ‘issues-based approach’ to child soldier prevention, it is imperative not to view 
the contribution of a single sub-regime of international law, such as IHL, in isolation.”85 
 In order to lay out a multidimensional legal framework of child soldiers’ legal 
protection, it is important to know and understand “not only the contribution of regimes 
such as IHL, IHRL and ICL to the problem at hand”, but also “the interaction of these 
regimes.”86 Consequently, this section will define and distinguish between IHL, ICL and 
IHRL by highlighting their commonalities and divergences, and by demonstrating their 
potential contributions and impacts in the codification of the legal protection of child 
soldiers. 
                                                     
82 Waschefort, supra note 5 at 54. 
83 Trevor Buck, International Child Law, 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 2011) at 20. 
84 Waschefort, supra note 5 at 54 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid at 74.  
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 As mentioned in chapter 1, IHL is the legal regime that applies to the conduct of 
hostilities between states or armed groups and is characterized by the core principle of 
distinction.87 Unfortunately, this area of law has not been very proactive in the efforts to 
develop strong principles aimed at eliminating the practice of child soldiering. Waschefort 
notes that “legal development within IHL is rather stagnant”, whereas “associated fields of 
international law” such as ICL and IHRL “have proven more agile.”88 Consequently, it is 
important to analyze these areas of law in order to better grasp what may be their respective 
contributions to the legal protection of child soldiers. 
 ICL “aims to deter and prohibit certain categories of conduct and impose criminal 
liability on individuals in retribution for such conduct.”89 Its purpose is to “create a 
universal legal consciousness” on certain types of crimes which are considered as 
inhumane, egregious or shocking for the humanity.90 In other words, ICL is focused on the 
punishment of proscribed behaviours, and, its approach will be characterized by a broad 
interpretation of prohibited conducts. Waschefort points out that “developments within 
ICL are the most recent, and this branch of law is most active in relation to prohibiting 
child soldiering.”91 
 However, it is worth noting that ICL and IHL, despite their different mandates, are 
interconnected.92 To that extent, it is crucial to remember that war crimes prohibited by 
ICL “are essentially IHL norms, the violation of which results in criminal responsibility on 
the international plane.”93 As highlighted in chapter 1, the Rome Statute considers that 
                                                     
87 AP I, supra note 11 art 77(2), AP 2 supra note 11 art 4(3)c); Yuvaraj, supra note 44 at 75. 
88 Waschefort, supra note 4 at 54. 
89Ibid.  
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid at 76. 
93 Ibid at 54. 
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conscripting, enlisting or using children under fifteen years old is a war crime and thus, a 
serious violation of IHL.94 
 IHRL is a far-reaching legal regime which establishes some core human rights 
norms. Such norms apply on states, both in times of peace and war, and are meant to protect 
individuals “from the abuse of power by states.”95 Therefore, there are some human right 
norms that can never be derogated from, regardless of whether there is an applicable lex 
specialis regime such as IHL during armed conflicts.96 These rights or prohibitions include 
“the right to life, prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, prohibition of slavery and servitude and the prohibition of retroactive criminal 
laws.”97 As highlighted earlier, the connection between child soldiers and the prohibition 
against slavery is found in the ILO N°182. 
 This instrument posited that the forced or compulsory recruitment of children has 
been identified by the ILO as a practice similar to slavery.98 According to Sampaio and 
McEvoy, the ILO N°182 is a significant treaty both in international law and towards the 
                                                     
94 Rome Statute, supra note 49, arts 8(2)(b)(xvii)), (e)(vii). 
95 Waschefort, supra note 5 at 79. 
96 ICRC, “International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law” (January 2003), 
online:<https://www.google.ca/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0a
hUKEwj-
orOQ28rUAhXH7YMKHaKNDkkQFggiMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.icrc.org%2Fen%2Fdownloa
d%2Ffile%2F1402%2Fihl-and-ihrl.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHew61mhzk2y4XPl-doBM4fQ8qhzg>. [ICRC on 
IHL &IHRL] 
97 Ibid. 
98 ILO N° 182, supra note 54, art 3(a). This Convention is among the eight ILO conventions that form the 
“core labour standards” having been recognized as “fundamental to the rights of human beings at work, 
irrespective of the level of development of individual member States.” 
(http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
declaration/documents/publication/wcms_095895.pdf) Thus, the connexion between the issue of child 
soldiers and the ILO principles is found in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work which identified the effective abolition of child labour as one of the preconditions for the 
“improvement of individual and collective conditions of work.” Moreover, the 1998 ILO principles apply 
to “all States belonging to the ILO, whether or not they have ratified the core Conventions”. (ILO 
fundamental Conventions supra note 58 at 7-8). 
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issue of child soldiers because it “is binding on all UN Member States, even those few 
which have yet to ratify.”99 
 Thus, while using a different lens, IHL and IHRL are complementary in their 
protection of children during armed conflicts, through their aim “to protect the lives, health 
and dignity of individuals.”100 The ICRC points out that, although “IHL and IHRL have 
historically had a separate development, recent treaties include provisions from both bodies 
of law” such as the CRC, the Optional Protocol to the CRC and the Rome Statute. It is not 
a coincidence that all these instruments, which incorporate both IHL, ICL and IHRL norms, 
have actively codified the prohibition against children’s recruitment and use in armed 
conflicts, as developed in chapter 1. This MRP posits that such overlap should be aimed at 
offering a strong and complementary legal framework for the protection of child soldiers, 
instead of confusing the applicable threshold. Unfortunately, each of these areas has 
designed their own standards and principles101 which has created “a gap […] in the 
protective regime”, as noted by Drumbl.102 
 In the next section, this MRP will argue that both IHL and ICL, while based on 
some valid and legitimate principles, may trigger contradictory effects towards children’s 
protection during armed conflicts, especially due to their diverging standards and 
applications of the concept of “direct” and /or “active” participation in hostilities. 
2.1  “Direct” vs “active” participation under IHL and ICL 
 Both IHL and ICL have limited the scope of their prohibition to a specific kind of 
participation in hostilities, whereas IHRL through soft law adopted a broader approach by 
                                                     
99 Sampaio & McEvoy, supra note 57 at 62. 
100 ICRC on IHL &IHRL supra note 96. 
101 Such as the different age limit between ICL, IHL and IHRL as discussed in see chapter 1. 
102 Drumbl, supra note 3 at 135. 
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prohibiting all kinds of children’s involvement (whether direct or active) in armed 
conflict.103 
 As presented in chapter 1, soft law has not limited its definition of child soldiers to 
their ‘direct’ or ‘active’ participation in military operations. Rather, it pointed out to the 
variety of roles and functions undertaken by children in armed groups, ranging from 
“cooks, messengers, spies” to sexual slaves.104 Such a broad delineation indicates that the 
prohibition on the recruitment and use of child soldiers does not only refer to children who 
are serving on the front lines of battlefield, but rather, any type of action that children 
perform in order to advance the collective interest of an armed group or force, or the 
personal interests of members of such group. This MRP asserts that such broad 
demarcation is positive because it offers a full and stronger protection to child soldiers due 
to its inclusiveness. In addition, such a large scope, represents an effective protection that 
diverges from the superficial and flawed distinction derived from the ‘active’ and ‘direct’ 
participation, as it will be presented in this section. 
 The best way to illustrate IHL’s and ICL’s approach is to reproduce the relevant 
provisions of AP I, II and the Rome Statute: 
AP I - Article 77 — Protection of children 
 
1. The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have 
not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, 
they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. […] 
 
AP II - Article 4 — Fundamental guarantees 
 
2. Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particular: 
 
c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the 
armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities; 
                                                     
103 Soft Law’s approach is reflected in the broad definitions of child soldiers in the Cape Town Principles 
and the Paris Principles. Both definitions were presented in this MRP, in chapter 1. 
104 Cape Town Principles, supra note 18; Paris Principles, supra note 19. 
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d) the special protection provided by this Article to children who have not attained the age 
of fifteen years shall remain applicable to them if they take a direct part in hostilities despite 
the provisions of sub-paragraph c) and are captured105; 
 
Rome Statute - Article 8 — War crimes 
 
For the purpose of this Statute, ‘war crimes’ means: 
(b) […] 
(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the 
national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities. 
(e) […] 
(vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed 
forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities; […].106 
[emphasis added] 
 
 It is clear that the prohibition against children’s participation has to satisfy the 
threshold of either ‘direct’ or ‘active’ participation in order to be considered as a violation 
of IHL or ICL. This requirement from hard law is distinct from the broader scope of soft 
law, as described earlier. Under IHL, ‘active’ and ‘direct’ participation have been 
interpreted as synonymous terms, whereas ICL has interpreted them as distinct concepts 
and applied them differently.107 
 This section will present and analyse the approaches adopted by IHL and ICL as to 
both terms, before comparing them to the positions of other scholars in the literature 
review. 
                                                     
105 There are some controversies as to the scope of AP I which prohibits children’s ‘direct’ participation as 
opposed to AP II which seems to prohibit a larger scope of participation by not including the term ‘direct’ 
and by prohibiting the recruitment or voluntary participation of children in hostilities. (The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute), (14 March 
2012) (International criminal Court, Trial Chamber I) at para 627<https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF>; Nathalie Wagner “A Critical Assessment of Using children to 
Participate Actively in Hostilities in Lubanga: Child Soldiers and Direct Participation”, online: (2013) 24:2 
Criminal Law Forum at 166 <https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10609-012-9194-0?no-
access=true>). 
106 Rome Statute, supra note 49, arts 8(2)(b)(xxvi), (e)(vii), AP 1 supra note 11, art 77(2), AP II1 supra 
note 11, art 4(3)c). Art 8(2)(b)(xxvi) refers to IACs whereas Art 8(2)(e)(vii) deals with NIACs. 
107 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 38 at 43, Yuvaraj supra note 44 at 71, Lubanga, supra note 105 
at paras 621, 627-628.  
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2.1.1 ‘Direct’ participation in hostilities under IHL 
 Under IHL, the concept of “direct participation in hostilities” (DPH) stems from 
the principle of distinction and has been adopted to grant protection to civilians.108 Schmitt 
posits that “one of the seminal purposes of the law is to make possible a clear distinction 
between civilians and combatants.”109 Accordingly, during armed conflicts, belligerents 
have to distinguish between civilians who cannot be targeted, and combatants who are 
subject to attacks. Moreover, IHL recognizes that the protection of civilians from direct 
attack will cease “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”110 
 Nevertheless, IHL has never explicitly defined what constitutes ‘direct’ 
participation. To clarify this concept, the ICRC published in 2009 the Interpretive 
Guidance On The Notion of Direct Participation Under International Humanitarian Law 
(ICRC Interpretive Guidance), which developed three constitutive elements for the finding 
of direct participation in hostilities (DPH). The ICRC emphasized that the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities is composed of two elements: that of “hostilities”, which “refers 
to the (collective) resort by the parties to the conflict to means and methods of injuring the 
enemy”, and that of “direct participation” which captures the “(individual) involvement of 
a person in these hostilities.”111 
 This MRP will present the three constitutive elements and will closely examine the 
third element by highlighting its inadequacy and inapplicability as to the specific context 
of child soldiers. First of all, the ICRC Interpretive Guidance stated that “the notion of 
direct participation in hostilities does not refer to a person’s status, function or affiliation, 
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but to his or her engagement in specific hostile acts.”112 In other words, DPH refers to 
specific acts or conduct, whether they are “spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized” or even 
when they are regular acts derived from a continuous combat function.113 Accordingly, it 
is not the status but the conduct that determines if someone is directly participating in 
hostilities. Unsurprisingly, the ICRC asserts that “under IHL, the concept of direct 
participation in hostilities refers to conduct which, if carried out by civilians suspend their 
protection against the dangers arising from military operations.”114 
 Therefore, the ICRC has established that in order for an act to qualify as a DPH, 
three conditions must be met cumulatively. First of all, “the act must be likely to adversely 
affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict, or 
alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against 
direct attack.”115 In other words, the act must “reasonably be expected to cause harm of a 
specifically military nature, or “in the absence of such military harm” the act must be likely 
“to cause at least death, injury, or destruction.”116 
 Secondly, there must be “a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to 
result either from that act or from a coordinated military operation of which that act 
constitutes an integral part”.117 This second condition focuses on the proximity between 
the act and the harm expected. As a matter of fact, the ICRC emphasizes that “the concept 
of direct participation in hostilities is restricted to specific acts that are so closely related to 
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the hostilities conducted between parties to an armed conflict that they constitute an 
integral part of those hostilities.”118 
 Finally, to satisfy the last condition which is the belligerent nexus, it has to be 
demonstrated that the act was “specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another.” 119 
The ICRC highlighted that if the act was not specifically designed in support of a party to 
an armed conflict and to the detriment of another, such act “cannot amount to any form of 
“participation” in hostilities taking place between these parties.”120 Furthermore, the ICRC 
has emphasized that the belligerent nexus “should be distinguished from concepts such as 
subjective intent and hostile intent”, since both notions “relate to the state of mind of the 
person concerned, whereas belligerent nexus relates to the objective purpose of the act.121 
The ICRC emphasizes that such “purpose is expressed in the design of the act or operation 
and does not depend on the mindset of every participating individual.”122 
 However, how can a certain act be “specifically designed” to support a party to the 
conflict without involving subjectivity and intent? The ICRC’s position is even harder to 
defend after comparing several definitions of the verb “to design” as illustrated below: 
To conceive and plan out in the mind.123 
Do or plan (something) with a specific purpose in mind.124 
To decide how something will be made, including how it will work and what it 
will look like, and often to make drawings of it.125 [emphasis added] 
 
                                                     
118 Ibid at 58. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid at 59. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid.  
123Merriam-Webster dictionary, sub verbo “to design” <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/design >. 
124 The Oxford English Dictionary, sub verbo “to design”, 
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/design>.  
125Macmillan Dictionary, sub verbo “to design”, 
<http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/design_2> . 
33 
 
 Therefore, “designing something” clearly involves subjectivity and intent of 
someone in the planning of an action. Such act can only be conducted by a commander or 
a chief who has some power or authority to plan military operations. Furthermore, adding 
the adjective “specifically” to the verb “to design” reinforces the necessity to demonstrate 
a certain degree of someone’s personal decision, commitment and involvement in the 
planning and conduct of an action. Although the ICRC admitted that in exceptional 
circumstances the mental state or the intent of an individual will be taken into 
consideration, such concession is still not enough to account for the meaning behind the 
belligerent nexus.126 
 In the next sections, this MRP will argue that intent is an important element that 
has to be considered in the assessment of DPH and that, children’s incapacity to form an 
intent to DPH negates their ability to be considered as combatants who are directly 
participating in hostilities and who can be targeted.127 As a matter of fact, Sampaio and 
McEvoy support that “international law […] calls for young children and those aged 15 
and above to be regarded as devoid of intent and unaware of their role in the conduct of 
hostilities.”128 Consequently, both authors argue that “children cannot be considered 
legally capable of directly participating in conflicts.”129 This MRP argues that any targeting 
of child soldiers is illegal, even if the use of force against them is possible and accepted 
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when child soldiers are used as frontlines and constitute a threat for opposing armed 
forces.130  
2.1.2 ‘Active’ participation under ICL 
 Both the Rome Statute and the SSCSL prohibit three specific actions related to 
children’s involvement in hostilities: their conscription, their enlistment and their use for 
active participation in hostilities.131 After clarifying the distinction between those three 
terms, this section will focus on the last concept related to children’s use for ‘active’ 
participation. 
 In the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the Trial Chamber highlighted that 
conscripting, enlisting and using children for DPH constitutes three “separate offences” 
which can be charged separately or cumulatively.132 To reach this conclusion, the Chamber 
analyzed each of the three offences and pointed out that a child can be “used” to participate 
actively in hostilities “without evidence being provided with respect to his or her earlier 
“conscription” or “enlistment” into the relevant armed force or group.”133 Therefore, the 
Chamber posited that ‘enlisting’ refers to the act of “enrol[ing] on the list of a military 
body”, whereas “conscripting” is defined as “to enlist compulsorily.”134 
 Consequently, the distinction between these two actions is found in the “added 
element of compulsion” of the term “conscription.”135 Sivakumaran warns against a narrow 
interpretation of both terms and notes that “conscription” and “enlistment” are both 
different ways to unlawfully recruit children.136 
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 As for children’s use for ‘active participation’, the Chamber noted that the Rome 
Statute drafters adopted the expression ‘using’ children to ‘participate actively in 
hostilities’ “in order to cover both direct participation in combat and also active 
participation in military activities.”137 Therefore, the Trial Chamber posited that “the use 
of the expression ‘to participate actively in hostilities’, as opposed to the expression ‘direct 
participation’ (as found in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions) was clearly 
intended to import a wide interpretation to the activities and roles that are covered by the 
offence of using children under the age of 15 actively to participate in hostilities.”138 
 As a result, the Trial Chamber concluded that ‘active’ participation covers both 
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ participation, and that “the decisive factor […] in deciding if an 
“indirect” role is to be treated as active participation in hostilities is whether the support 
provided by the child to the combatants exposed him or her to real danger as a potential 
target.”139 Therefore, the Chamber acknowledged that “those who participate actively in 
hostilities include a wide range of individuals, from those on the front line (who participate 
directly) through to the boys or girls who are involved in a myriad of roles that support the 
combatants.”140 Accordingly, to determine whether a specific role qualifies as active 
participation, it must be proven that “the child concerned is, at the very least, a potential 
target.”141 
 Such interpretation has been criticized because it extended “the scope of persons 
who may be legitimately targeted by an adverse party.”142 Sivakumaran emphasized that 
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the ICC’s approach is problematic because it does not provide any guidance as to what 
constitute a ‘real danger’ or a ‘potential target.’143 His position and other similar positions 
of scholars will be developed in the literature review to demonstrate the extent to which 
the ICC’s approach is ambiguous and unhelpful for children’s protection in armed 
conflicts. 
 Unsurprisingly, both IHL and ICL encapsulate important norms on the prohibition 
of child soldiers. Nevertheless, analyzing the issue on child soldiers using only one of these 
approaches can be limiting and narrow without paying a closer attention to soft law and 
human rights instruments. The next section will explore the literature to highlight how the 
ICRC’s and the ICC’s tests have been received, contrasted, or confirmed in international 
law through the use of IHL, ICL and IHRL. This part will aim to highlight the strength and 
limitations of the arguments posited by scholars about the scope of active and direct 
participation, while highlighting the advantages to including IHRL in the discussions 
related to the prohibition of the practice of child soldiering. 
2.2 Literature review 
  Much has been written on the terms ‘active’ and ‘direct’ participation in the 
literature. However, so far, a consensus on the meaning of both terms has not been reached, 
except a redundant observation from scholars on the ambiguity of either one or these terms 
as it will be discussed in this section. This MRP has selected articles and book chapters 
which have closely examined the nature of the prohibition against civilians’ direct 
participation and children’s participation in hostilities. Some authors such as Sivakumaran, 
Sampaio and McEvoy have aligned with, contrasted or rejected the ICRC’s guidance on 
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the notion of DPH, while others such as Wagner and Yuvaraj have investigated the ICC’s 
definition of ‘active’ participation and evidenced its weaknesses or positive inputs. 
 Through a dialogue between scholars, this literature review will investigate whether 
chid soldiers would be better protected by a broad or narrow scope of the prohibition 
against children’s ‘direct’ or ‘active’ participation. In other words, this section will 
examine the pros and cons of using an extensive or narrow codification of children’s 
participation in armed conflicts by highlighting its advantages and drawbacks for children’s 
protection. To support is findings, this literature review will distinguish between two main 
approaches: the conservative approach, which focuses on IHL principles and adopts a one-
sided analysis, and the multidimensional approach, which goes beyond the mere principles 
of IHL and ICL by bring some notions of IHRL. 
2.2.1 Conservative approach 
 This approach is supported by Schmitt, Naqvi, Bianchi and Wagner, and is 
characterized by its essential focus on IHL’s traditional principles, and by its radical 
rejection of human rights principles when dealing with the finding of ‘direct’ participation. 
 In his article entitled “Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by 
Private Contractors or Civilian Employees”, Michael Schmitt examines the scope of the 
various roles undertaken by government civilian employees or private contractors in the 
war in Iraq.144 He notes that such participation is highly problematic due to their lack of 
accountability in the case of misconduct.145 He concludes that government employees or 
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private contractors do not satisfy the threshold to become lawful combatants under IHL.146 
This analysis is relevant in the context of civilians undertaking roles that are traditionally 
reserved for combatants such as child soldiers who are illegally deployed on the battlefield. 
 Nevertheless, Schmitt asserts that, despite the lack of a lawful status as a combatant, 
“a civilian who participates in hostilities remains a valid military objective until 
unambiguously opting out through extended nonparticipation or an affirmative act of 
withdrawal.”147 While interesting, this alternative constitutes a risky exercise for the 
unlawful combatant because he or she will continue to assume the risk of being targeted, 
particularly in the case where “the other side is unaware of such withdrawal”, as pointed 
out by Schmitt himself.148 Similarly, Sivakumaran rightly notes that this approach “suffers 
from the evidential difficulty that would be required for such a showing.”149 
 To assess civilians’ participation in hostilities, Schmitt argues that, there has to be 
a “but for” causation, which evidences the connexion between the act and its consequences, 
a “causal proximity” as to the ensuing consequence, and, “a mens rea of intent.”150 Based 
on this framework, it is clear that child soldiers under 15 would not qualify as military 
objective due to their recognized lack of intent.151 As a matter of fact, McEvoy and 
Sampaio claimed that “children are, irrespective of their age, too immature to choose to 
perform such a hazardous occupation as directly participating in an armed conflict.”152 
 Both authors also support the idea that child soldiers lack the necessary intent to be 
considered as combatants who can be legitimately targeted. In addition, Schmitt supports 
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a liberal interpretation of the notion of ‘direct participation’ and emphasizes that such 
finding should occur even in case of doubt on whether civilians’ actions amount to direct 
participation in hostilities.153 He declares that “the methodology that best approximates the 
underlying intent of the direct participation notion is to interpret the term liberally, in other 
words in favor of finding direct participation.”154 He justifies this position by the fact that 
IHL requests belligerents to distinguish themselves from civilian population at all times.155 
 Finally, he argues that “while broadly interpreting the activities that subject 
civilians to attack might seem counterintuitive from a humanitarian perspective, it actually 
enhances the protection of the civilian population as a whole by encouraging distance from 
hostile operations.”156 
  However, Schmitt’s interpretation is not supported by IHL. Articles 50 and 51(3) 
of AP I stipulate the opposite. Article 50 declares that “in case of doubt whether a person 
is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.”157 Similarly, Article 51(3) 
posits that “in case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian 
purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used 
to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so 
used.”158 Thus, it is clear that IHL’s priority remains the protection of civilian from military 
operations. Consequently, in all cases of uncertainty as to the status of an individual, IHL 
supports that his or her civilian status shall be presumed. The preservation of this status is 
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important because it will grant a protection from unlawful targeting.159 This MRP argues 
that this important principle should be enforced even more vigorously in the specific case 
of child soldiers. As a matter of fact, Schmitt’s claim is also flawed if applied in the specific 
context of children’s participation where more protections have been granted or 
recognized. 
 In the same vein as Schmitt, Bianchi and Naqvi seek to clarify the applicable law 
that governs the conduct of hostilities by exploring the concept of direct participation in 
the specific context of terrorism and counter-terrorism.160 Bianchi and Naqvi highlight that 
the “exact scope of the notion of direct participation in hostilities remains a question of 
controversy” in the literature due to the fact that such term has been traditionally interpreted 
as only referring to hostile acts directed against enemy forces. Both authors regret that DPH 
has never been considered as also referring to hostile acts against civilians.161 Naqvi and 
Bianchi note that according to this narrow interpretation of DPH, “a terrorist attack against 
civilians, which did not harm the personnel or equipment of the enemy forces, would not 
be considered direct participation in hostilities”, unless it is concluded that the civilian 
population is a “center of gravity” in asymmetrical warfare, and a valid target that enables 
the achievement of victory or the disadvantage of enemy forces.162 
 Interestingly, based on the finding of the necessity to have a “causal relationship 
between the act and its immediate consequences”, Naqvi and Bianchi note that “mere 
membership of a terrorist organization would not suffice to render a person liable to 
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attack”, unless the person engage in “an act that by its nature or purpose was likely to cause 
real damage to enemy forces.”163 This MRP supports that even in the context of terrorism, 
international law should not allow the targeting of child soldiers based on their status or 
conduct, unless they constitute a threat as it will be presented in chapter 3. 
 However, contrary to the ICRC guidance on the notion of DPH, Schmitt, Bianchi 
and Naqvi did not address the issue of intent which, in the case of the issue on child soldiers 
is crucial because it constitutes a major argument against the finding of their DPH.164 
Therefore, it is unclear whether both authors would consider the participation of children 
in terrorist activities as amounting to direct participation in the case where there is enough 
proximity between their acts and consequences, despite the absence of children’s intent. In 
addition, it is uncertain whether both authors would align with Schmitt’s proposition 
related to the finding of DPH in case of doubt as to the nature of the act committed by the 
civilian. 
 In her article entitled “a critical assessment of using children to participate actively 
in hostilities in Lubanga: child soldiers and direct participation”, Wagner focuses her 
analysis on the letter of the law.165 She examines the findings of the Trial Chamber in the 
Lubanga case, particularly the one related to the distinction between ‘active’ and ‘direct’ 
participation. Wagner posits that “the meaning of active participation in hostilities under 
sub-paragraph 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and (e)(vii) is not ambiguous or obscure, but is the same as 
that of direct participation in hostilities under international humanitarian law.”166 She 
                                                     
163 Ibid at 183.  
164 As discussed earlier, the CRC, the ICC and several authors have recognized children’s lack of intent, 
which, following the three elements defined by the ICRC Interpretive Guidance on DPH excludes any 
possibility to find that children are DPHing. 
165 Wagner, supra note 105. 
166 Ibid at 150.  
42 
 
affirms that the trial chamber in Lubanga has introduced a superficial distinction between 
‘active’ and ‘direct’ participation that is not supported by the letter of the law.167 
 To demonstrate her reasoning, Wagner highlights that the absence of the term 
“direct” under article 4(3)(c) of APII should have not been given much weight by the 
court.168 Accordingly, she posits that “article 4 of APII, sub-paragraph 3(c), when read in 
conjunction with sub-paragraph 3(d) appears to prohibit the direct participation of children 
under the age of 15 in hostilities.”169 Therefore, Wagner argues that the omission of the 
term ‘direct’ or ‘active’ “in a certain part of an article should not be taken to mean that the 
prohibition is one other than direct.”170 Accordingly, she argues that the law has only 
prohibited the ‘direct’ participation of children in both provisions. 
 Moreover, she emphasizes that “any difference in the text of article 77(2) of AP I 
and article 4(3)(c) of AP II, is in fact, negligible.”171 She refers to Professor Doswald-Beck 
who asserted that “not much should be read into this difference”, since “the final version 
of the text of Protocol II was a simpler version of Protocol I presented in the last days of 
the conference without extensive discussion.”172 However, such argumentation is 
misleading insofar as it juxtaposes the ordinary meaning of a term against the context of 
its codification. Brantingham and Solomon posit that “all solid treaty interpretation begins 
with the words of a provision itself, as they are commonly understood”, and that the 
contextual interpretation of a treaty has been relegated to a secondary position. 173 Thus, 
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one may refer to contextual meaning “only where the text is ‘ambiguous or obscure,’ or 
when the plain meaning of the text leads to a “manifestly absurd or unreasonable” result.174 
None of the above supports Wagner’s claim. Thus, it seems legitimate to assert that the 
lack of the term ‘direct’ in article 4(3)(c) may reflect a larger protection under AP II 
contrary to AP I, as argued by the Lubanga case, Sivakumaran and Yuvaraj.175 
 After presenting the three constitutive elements of DPH from the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guidance, Wagner posits that these elements highlight a key difference 
between “participation in the war effort” and “participation in hostilities.”176 She points out 
that “active participation in the war effort (e.g., civilians who supply food to the army or 
other such war sustaining activities) does not itself constitute participation in hostilities.”177 
Therefore, “in order for preparatory activities to fall within the scope of direct participation, 
such activities must be of a “specifically military nature and so closely linked to the 
subsequent execution of a specific hostile act that they already constitute an integral part 
of that act.”178 
 Accordingly, “preparatory activities that are merely designed to “establish general 
capacity to carry out unspecified hostile acts”, including general training, for example, do 
not fall within the scope of direct participation in hostilities.”179 Wagner points out that the 
prohibition related to participation in hostilities is only focused on the ‘direct’ participation 
and does not include “indirect acts of participation by children such as gathering and 
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transmission of military information, transportation of arms and munitions, provisions of 
supplies, etc.”180 
 Wagner emphasizes that the broad definition of “active participation” in Lubanga 
“risks reducing the protection for children and for civilians in general” because it allows 
more activities to be considered as hostile acts, which justifies their targetability.181 The 
author points out that under IHL and ICL there was a consistent interpretation of ‘direct’ 
as being synonymous to ‘active’ participation, contrary to the findings of Lubanga.182 Put 
simply, Wagner argues that “those not directly participating cannot be targeted and thus, 
cannot be potential targets.”183 
 This position seems to be aimed at protecting child soldiers who perform support 
functions or who are used to participate indirectly in hostilities. However, such 
understanding is problematic because it does not criminalize the indirect use of children 
who are also exposed to violence and abuse despite their absence or visibility from the 
battlefield.184 Van Bueren insists that children’s indirect participation is equivalent to 
“specific forms of exploitation”, which justifies the prohibition of all kinds of children’s 
participation in armed conflicts.185 She also points out that during the codification of the 
CRC, the “ICRC has opposed the insertion of the word “direct” because it would appear to 
exclude indirect acts of participation which are capable of being as life-threatening and 
dangerous as direct combat.”186 Leibig points out that “the focus on children serving in 
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combat positions overshadows the experiences of many children who are abducted or 
recruited into armed forces and then forced into serving as domestic and sexual slaves.”187 
 Therefore, it is clear that to protect effectively children from being recruited or used 
in armed conflicts, the law has to set a blanket prohibition against all types of children’s 
participation, and such prohibition must not distinguish between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ acts 
of participation.188 This MRP argues that international law needs to reach a consensus on 
such a blanket prohibition to offer an exhaustive and stronger protection to children 
affected by armed conflicts. 
2.2.2 Multidimensional approach 
 This approach is advocated by Sivakumaran, Yuvaraj, Sampaio and McEvoy and 
is aimed at establishing a dialogue between various areas of international law such as IHL, 
ICL and IHRL. 
 Sivakumaran investigates the rules and principles related to the protection of 
civilians and Person Hors de Combat which incorporates the principle of non-
discrimination and certain prohibitions against physical and psychological abuses.189 
Sivakumaran examines specific categories of individuals who benefit from particular 
protections such as the wounded, sick and shipwreck, the medical and religious personnel, 
the interned and detained persons, children or child soldiers. With respect to the protection 
of child soldiers, Sivakumaran points out to the wider prohibition of AP II and asserts that 
“the customary prohibition is on all forms of [children’s] participation in hostilities”, at 
least for NIACs, whereas uncertainty persists as to the scope of the prohibition for IACs.190 
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Yuvaraj disagrees and argues that children enjoy the same protection both under IACs and 
NIACs.191 
 Moreover, the author notes that, although some statutes such as the Rome Statute 
have undermined the “existing standards” by adopting “the weaker prohibition” of ‘active 
participation’, “states that are parties to both Additional Protocol II and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child remain subject to the stricter standards of the Protocol”, which 
proscribes both the recruitment and the participation of children under fifteen in 
hostilities.192 
 Sivakumaran regrets the limited scope adopted by IHL’s and ICL’s prohibitions, 
which are respectively focused on the ‘direct’ and ‘active’ participation. According to the 
author, such terms are problematic because they raise “difficulty in drawing a distinction 
between acts that constitute direct or active participation in hostilities and those that do 
not.”193 This MRP agrees with Sivakumaran’s point as to the lack of clarity and 
effectiveness since both terms are still controversial or ambiguous. 
 Moreover, Sivakumaran rejects as Wagner does the broad interpretation of ‘active’ 
participation from the Lubanga judgement and emphasizes the lack of clarity of the 
threshold adopted by the ICC. As a matter of fact, he argues that the ICC’s approach 
“suggests that certain activities at a certain point in time would not amount to active 
participation in hostilities as the child is not exposed to danger as a potential target, but the 
same activities at a different point in time may well amount to active participation.”194 This 
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is due to the fact that the court did not clarify what kind of danger is a real danger for a 
child. Does the danger only refer to situation where the child can be killed, recognised by 
enemy forces or kidnapped and used by armed groups? What about the danger faced by 
child soldiers who have been or are at risk of being sexually abused by their own groups 
as highlighted by the Ntaganda case195? 
 According to Sivakumaran, the ICC’s position is unclear and ambiguous because 
“by the time it is realized that the child may be in real danger, it may well be too late.”196 
Moreover, the Lubanga case seems to have acknowledged the confusion of its approach by 
stating that a case-by-case analysis should be conducted every time to determine if ‘active’ 
participation happened.197 Contrary to the ICC, Sivakumaran clarified that such case-by-
case determination should only be reserved for grey areas.198 This is due to the fact that 
such individualized assessment may prove perilous and uncertain for child soldiers as it 
“may be subject to varying viewpoints”, while triggering “a dramatic effect upon the 
conclusion with regard to the legality of a particular target.”199 
 Dissenting Judge Benito claimed that refusing “to enter a comprehensive legal 
definition of a crime” by leaving it “open to a case-by-case analysis or to the limited scope 
of the charges brought against the accused” is failing to protect the life and integrity of 
child soldiers, while constituting a “step backwards in the progressive development of 
international law.”200 This position is also shared by Sivakumaran who supports the 
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establishment of a general framework of protection which would allow some exceptions or 
further analysis in case of unclear or ambiguous situation.201 
 In addition, Sivakumaran points out that in the case that they do not reach the 
threshold of ‘active participation’, “many of these activities would, however fall within the 
notion of [direct] participation in hostilities and would thus be prohibited under the law of 
non-international armed conflict.”202 This nuance clearly shows that Sivakumaran does not 
automatically equate ‘direct’ participation to ‘active’ participation since he sees in the latter 
concept a default regime which can be used as a catch-all category. 
  Therefore, this MRP argues that more effort should be focused on the creation of 
a clear and operational framework of analysis which would encompass both ‘direct’ and 
‘indirect’ participation. Unfortunately, Sivakumaran does not clarify if he would opt for 
another definition of ‘active participation’ as an alternative to the ICC’s broad 
interpretation nor did he provide elements to distinguish between ‘active’ and ‘direct’ 
participation. Moreover, it remains unclear whether Sivakumaran considers child soldiers 
who are participating in hostilities as combatants, unlawful combatants or civilians. 
 Yuvaraj investigates the scope of children’s activities which amount to ‘direct’ or 
‘active’ participation in hostilities under IHL and ICL. The author examines the terms 
‘direct’ and ‘active’ under the Additional Protocols, the CRC and the Lubanga case. As 
highlighted by Sivakumaran, Yuvaraj notes that, under AP II, there is a blanket prohibition 
against all kinds of children’s participation in hostilities, contrary to AP I which only 
prohibits children’s “direct” participation.203 In addition, Yuvaraj notes that “the degree of 
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this difference is unclear given the lack of certainty of the scope of activities covered by 
“direct” in article 77(2) of AP I.”204 Furthermore, he examines article 38 of the CRC on the 
prohibition of children’s participation in hostilities and notes the use of the same wording 
as in AP I.205 Interestingly, Yuvaraj points out that “it was felt that [this] provision could 
undermine IHL because it was inconsistent with the level of protection offered in article 
4(3) of APII.”206 Yuvaraj agrees with Sivakumaran by emphasizing that the term “direct” 
should not have been incorporated in article 38 of the CRC “because it allows children to 
be used to indirectly participate in hostilities.”207 He suspects that this incorporation was 
due to the lack of a consensus on the necessity to adopt a blanket prohibition against 
children’s participation (direct and indirect participation) among the CRC’s drafters.208 
 In addition, Yuvaraj points out that the criticisms of the Lubanga case result mainly 
from the fact the court made children more targetable by recognizing that ‘active’ 
participation encompasses both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ participation.209 To address these 
criticisms, Yuvaraj points out that the ICC should clarify the scope of the term “active” 
towards IHL and IHRL to avoid any overlap or confusions.210 Thus, Yuvaraj claims that 
the use of the term “active” in the Rome Statute is strictly to be understood in the specific 
context related to the protection of children’s recruitment and use, whereas the term 
“direct” is a generic term used by IHL in order to achieve its core principle of distinction.211 
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 Consequently, Yuvaraj asserts that “the interpretation of ‘active’ for the purpose of 
protecting children is likely not to affect the interpretation of ‘active’ or ‘direct’ for the 
purpose of distinguishing between combatants and civilians.”212 Yuvaraj’s position is in 
harmony with Sampaio’s and McEvoy’s arguments on the necessity to distinguish the 
concepts of “direct” in IHL and “active” in ICL. 
 Indeed, in their article entitled “Little Weapons of War: Reasons for and 
Consequences of Treating Child Soldiers as Victims”, Sampaio and McEvoy investigate 
the legal framework on children’s protection in international law.213 They assert that both 
‘active’ and ‘direct’ participation have distinct purposes and thresholds, which justifies the 
necessity to contextualize each of these terms. The authors support that “the purpose of 
‘direct participation in hostilities’, is normally to serve as a pillar to the principle of 
distinction, which protects victims of armed conflicts while determining that only 
combatants can be lawfully targeted.”214 They claim, on the one hand that “direct 
participation in hostilities is, therefore, usually a concept that is used for the protection of 
civilians, limiting the conduct of belligerent parties vis-à-vis their targeting operations.”215 
On the other hand, the authors support that “the concept of direct participation in conflicts, 
when used in relation to children, does not have any connection with the principle of 
distinction.”216 
  To reach this conclusion, Sampaio and McEvoy examine several provisions such 
as Articles 77(2) in AP1, 4(3) c) and 38(2) in the CRC. They observe that in all these 
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provisions, the law not only prohibit children’s recruitment and participation in hostilities, 
but also puts the burden on states, armed groups and any other actor who may be involved 
in the involvement of children in hostilities.217 According to the authors, such language 
clearly demonstrates that “the international community has utilized the words “direct 
participation in hostilities” in multiple instruments in relation to children solely to make it 
illegal for belligerent forces to use children in combat rather than aiming to establish the 
circumstances when children can be targeted in accordance with the principle of 
distinction.”218 
 In addition, the authors examined art 51(3) which posits that “civilians shall enjoy 
the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part 
in hostilities.”219 Sampaio and McEvoy notice that in this provision there is no burden put 
on belligerents to ensure the absence of civilians from the battlefield, contrary to the 
previous provisions.220 Consequently, the authors argue that only civilians who violate this 
provision will face the direct consequence of being targeted. 
 Moreover, the authors examine the three constitutive elements of DPH from the 
ICRC Interpretive Guidance and they observe that in order to satisfy the belligerent 
nexus221 there has to be a certain intent, contrary to the ICRC’s position.222 Sampaio and 
McEvoy disagree with the ICRC’s reasoning, and they question the ICRC’s choice to find 
relevant the intent of involuntary shield and not child soldiers’ intent.223 Interestingly, Van 
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Bueren argues in the same way by noting that “armed conflict are inherently brutalising 
and [children’s] very nature makes it impossible for those under 18 to give free and 
informed consent.”224 
 Sampaio and McEvoy posit that the prohibition against children’s recruitment or 
participation who are under fifteen is justified by the fact that children under fifteen are not 
“considered mature enough to choose to join belligerent parties to a conflict, let alone to 
participate in combat operations in favor of these parties.”225 In other words, both authors 
argue that children under fifteen years lack the intent to participate in hostilities “just as 
involuntary human shields”, particularly “due to their presumed absolute legal incapacity 
to choose to do so under international law.”226 Consequently, Sampaio and McEvoy seem 
to agree with this MRP that children can never constitute legitimate target, contrary to 
adults civilians unlawfully participating in hostilities or adults regular combatants. 
Conclusion on the literature review 
 This literature review compared several approaches and positions on the question 
of children’s legal protection during armed conflicts and analyzed whether children would 
be better protected with a large or narrow interpretation of the terms ‘direct’ or ‘active’. To 
answer this question, this literature review presented two main approaches: the 
conservative and the multidimensional approach. The conservative approach was 
supported by Schmitt, Naqvi, Bianchi and Wagner and was reflected by the scholars’ 
attempt to address the issue on child soldiers by solely focusing their analysis on IHL’s 
traditional principles and by their full rejection of the broadening of concepts or terms 
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related to the prohibition against child soldiering. The main answer from this approach was 
a categorical refusal to broaden the concept of ‘direct’ or ‘active’ participation, which were 
limited to military operations. However, only Schmitt has explicitly supported the finding 
of DPH in case of doubt, thus contradicting IHL principles. 
  Unfortunately, this approach proved narrow and incomplete. For instance, 
Schmitt’s proposition as to the finding of direct participation even in case of doubt runs 
counter the principles of IHL which are aimed at the protection of civilians, especially in 
case of doubt as to the scope of their liability during hostilities. Naqvi’s and Bianchi’s 
attention to the proximity between the act and its consequence in the context of terrorist 
activities left some gaps as to the relevance of the assessment of the intent of the combatant, 
especially in the case of a children’s participation. Wagner’s design of a test aimed at 
finding direct participation in case where not only there is a proximity between the act and 
the consequence, but also when the act is inherently of a military nature missed all non-
military and indirect acts committed by children which are also prohibited by CIL and soft 
law. 
 By contrast, the multidimensional approach as the one advocated by Sivakumaran, 
Yuvaraj, Sampaio and McEvoy favoured a dialogue between several areas of international 
law such as IHL, ICL and IHRL. This rich and diversified analysis has been able to clearly 
demonstrate the weaknesses of IHL and ICL when tackling the issue of children’s 
participation in isolation. All scholars belonging to this approach recognized that ‘direct’ 
and ‘active’ are both unclear and ambiguous concepts, which in the absence of a better and 
consistent definition in international law, will only serve to blur the lines of the prohibition 
against children’s participation in armed conflicts. 
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 Contrary to the conservative approach, Sivakumaran, Sampaio and McEvoy 
recognized that ‘direct’ and ‘active’ participation are not synonymous. Sivakumaran, 
compared IHL, ICL and IHRL and regretted that the Rome Statute undermined the existing 
norms by only prohibiting children’s ‘active’ participation. However, he asserted that in 
the absence of the finding of children’s ‘active’ participation, the court could still recognize 
their ‘direct’ participation which is also prohibited in international law. Yuvaraj, as well as 
Sampaio and McEvoy, agreed as to the necessity to distinguish between the use of the term 
‘direct’ to refer to the general context of the principle of distinction and the term ‘active’ 
to point out to the specific context of children’s participation. This MRP agrees that such 
distinction may constitute an interesting alternative to protect children from all kinds of 
participation, while preserving the protection afforded to civilians who are not unlawfully 
participating in armed conflicts. 
 In the next section, this MRP will provide its reasoning in support of the 
multidimensional approach by emphasizing its potential contributions for the legal 
protection of child soldiers, while highlighting some precautionary principles that armed 
groups or forces need to respect when dealing with child soldiers. 
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Chapter 3: Re-imagining children’s protection through IHRL and 
military guidance 
 
3. Relevance of a broader scope for children’s legal protection 
 At this stage, this MRP has already clarified that child civilians and child soldiers 
are considered as children who are victims of the brutality and abuse of adults during armed 
conflicts. In addition, this MRP demonstrated that children share the same vulnerability 
and immaturity, and that these inherent commonalities have justified the establishment of 
a special protection for all children under fifteen affected by armed conflicts, regardless of 
their conduct or status. In this part, the author will build her arguments by contrasting or 
validating some of the claims posited in the literature review by scholars, and will 
emphasize the relevance of IHRL and military guidelines on the specific context of child 
soldiers. 
3.1 Justification for an extensive application of human rights norms in the 
codification of child soldiers’ protection 
 Sampaio and McEvoy examined the concept of direct participation by comparing 
IHL and IHRL, and they pointed out that “human rights law […] determines that, when 
children are specifically concerned, all actions must be taken with their best interest as the 
primary consideration.”227 As a matter of fact, the CRC has codified the principle of 
children’s best interests which advocates that “in all actions concerning children, whether 
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative 
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
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consideration.”228 Similarly, Waschefort points out that “the best interest of the child is a 
trite principle of international law” which requires “a higher threshold” of legal 
protection.229 
 Children’s best interests have been defined by the United Nations’ High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as relating to the “well-being of a child” and is 
determined “by a variety of individual circumstances, such as the age, the level of maturity 
of the child, the presence or absence of parents, the child’s environment and 
experiences.”230 It is clear that the experience of violence and fear during armed conflicts 
by child soldiers is a relevant factor that affects their best interests. 
 However, Wagner asserts that, during armed conflicts, IHL has priority over other 
legal regimes such as IHRL, which are supposed to apply “only in the absence of definition 
under the laws of armed conflict.231 Thus, she states that the “IHL rule of direct 
participation in hostilities prevails over human rights rule in a situation of armed 
conflict.”232 Nevertheless, it is unfounded to exclude or to minimize the application of 
IHRL during armed conflicts since IHL has also recognized the importance of human rights 
through the principle of humanity. 233 To that extent, Melzer and Kuster note that “IHL 
comprises those rules of international law which establish minimum standards of humanity 
that must be respected in any situation of armed conflict.”234 In the same vein, Waschefort 
points out that “IHL is generally, though not always, the lex specialis during armed 
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conflict.”235 Moreover, he argues that “IHRL is theoretically applicable at all times, 
although derogation from some provisions is permitted during states of emergency.”236 
Thus, this author highlights that it is a mistake to consider that “during armed conflict, IHL 
supplants IHRL totally.”237 Most importantly, Waschefort notes that “IHRL has developed 
child protection with respect to prohibiting the recruitment of child soldiers significantly 
in that child soldier recruitment is prevented during times of peace as well.”238 This MRP 
agrees with this observation and asserts that IHRL may contribute to design a better frame 
for the codification and application of the legal protection of child soldiers when combined 
with IHL and ICL. 
 Therefore, this project argues that each time that an action or a decision involving 
child soldiers has to be taken, child soldiers’ experience of violence and fear on a daily 
basis should be considered. Lieutenant Colonel Leandro specified that “children remain 
children even if they are carrying out intelligence activities or aiming a loaded weapon at 
a peacekeeper.”239 In addition, he posits that “a child soldier is always a victim to be looked 
after and is never to be held accountable.”240 Thus, despite the ambiguity on the concept of 
child soldiering, the preservation of the status of children for child soldiers should remain 
the priority of international law. 
 Since the involvement of children in armed conflicts trigger not only additional 
legal considerations but also the application of human rights principles such as children’s 
best interests, it is not unusual to import such principles in the specific context of child 
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soldiering. To that extent, Sivakumaran points out that according to European human 
rights, “lethal force may not be used against fighters in situations in which it is feasible to 
arrest them” because “to kill fighters when it would have been feasible to capture them 
constitutes a violation of human rights law.”241 This author recognizes that such developing 
principle, though constituting “an important divergence from the position under 
international humanitarian law” has started to influence IHL.242 
 As a matter of fact, the ICRC has asserted that “it would defy basic notions of 
humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving him or her an opportunity to 
surrender where there manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force.”243 In other 
words, despite the permissive character of IHL, belligerents do not have “carte blanche to 
wage unrestricted war” due to the application of some foundational human right norms, 
which belongs to the principle of humanity.244 This MRP argues that this principle should 
be enforced vigorously in the specific context of children’s participation in hostilities and 
that every child soldier should be given an opportunity to surrender when possible. 
 Consequently, a multidisciplinary analysis of the issue on child soldiers’ protection 
highlights that both IHL, IHRL and ICL are in favour of a strong legal framework to 
enforce the prohibition against children’s participation in hostilities, although they use 
different approaches. IHL protects children through the ‘special protection’ which grants 
specific rights and privileges to children affected by armed conflicts. IHRL confirms this 
principle and adds the necessity to preserve children’s best interests every time that a 
decision involving a child has to be taken. ICL criminalised the use of children in armed 
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conflict by raising such prohibition to the rank of a war crime and by confirming the lack 
of legal capacity for children under fifteen years and their inability to consent to their 
participation in hostilities. This MRP posits that a framework combining all these three 
areas of law, while taking into considerations the knowledge and savoir-faire from military 
guidelines can help strengthen children’s legal protection during armed conflicts. 
3.2 Regulations for the use of force against child soldiers 
 This MRP argues that the legal protection of children, due to their acknowledged 
vulnerabilities and immaturity requires a different methodology or approach than the one 
applied to adults.245 Waschefort argues that it is a serious error to treat children and adults 
with the same standards, because children do not have “the same decision-making and 
cognitive abilities as adults.246 Similarly, Kuper emphasizes that “additional restraints 
should be exercised when soldiers are aware that child soldiers are present in an opposing 
force.”247 As a matter of fact, she points out that even soldiers on the ground with low level 
of literacy and training must be aware that “IHL and human rights rules for the protection 
of adults apply equally to children, and arguably should be applied to children with 
particular diligence, due to their vulnerability and entitlement to ‘special treatment’.”248 
  The Canadian Forces JDN clarified that “given the complexities that will exist in 
a given theatre if child soldiers are encountered, robust legal principles and guidance need 
to be in place to ensure that CAF are aware of their legal obligations. 249 Furthermore, this 
instrument points out that “legal review will be required on all mission-specific order 
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addressing circumstances where there is potential involvement of child soldiers.”250 This 
is a clear indication that there is a heavy legal burden on opposing forces who are aware of 
the presence of child soldiers, and this burden requires them to adopt or consider additional 
legal obligations of international law. For instance, this Doctrine notes that one of these 
constraints “may be the requirement to report the Six Grave Violations […]” or “the 
requirement to not keep detained child soldiers in the same detention location as adult 
detainees.”251 
 Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel Leandro asserts that “targeting and self-defense 
require an extensive application of the International Humanitarian Law principles” and that 
“the minimum use of force and the proportionality principle are to be used together and 
combined with non-lethal options in case of direct engagement” against child soldiers.252 
Moreover, he points out that “the discrimination principle, in addition to its regular legal 
application, should also be used to discriminate inside the military target, between regular 
soldiers and child soldiers, or at least to avoid/reduce collateral damages on child 
soldiers.”253 Consequently, it is clear that opposing forces who are confronted with child 
soldiers need to take additional precautions that are usually not required when dealing with 
regular combatants such as the consideration of the principle of proportionality.254 
 However, the Canadian JDN recognizes that child soldiers who serve on the 
frontlines can be targeted if they pose a threat for the opposing forces provided that the 
necessary precautions and additional assessments have been conducted before any 
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attack.255 This Doctrine supports that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) “will retain the 
right to use force, to protect themselves from the threat of serious injury of death, even 
from a child soldier” since “a child soldier with a rifle or grenade launcher can present as 
much of a threat as an adult soldier carrying the same armament.”256 Furthermore, the 
Canadian JDN highlights that such use of force will be selected after all other options to 
protect child soldiers have been considered. As a matter of fact, this Doctrine posits that 
“if forced to engage child soldiers”, opposing forces should always “seek to engage adults 
within the group first” because usually “the adult leadership of a unit of child soldier will 
often represent the tactical centre of gravity”, and the “loss of such authority figures will 
often result in a loss of cohesion” in this unit.257 
 Likewise, Singer argues that “the leader’s control is the center of gravity” which 
justifies the fact that armed forces should “engage adult targets first if possible.”258 
Moreover, Singer posits that “if the adult leader is killed or forced to take cover, the whole 
organization often breaks down.”259 Therefore, this MRP argues that the use of lethal force 
against child soldiers should only be considered as a self-defence strategy when there is no 
other viable option. Lieutenant Colonel Leandro points out that in the case where child 
soldiers constitute a threat to peacekeeping operations, they are “a legitimate target to 
detain, to keep in custody, to neutralize, to separate from adult dominance, and as a last 
resort to use lethal fire with non-lethal intent.”260 
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Conclusion 
 In this chapter, this MRP argued that international law cannot address, in a 
satisfactory way, the issue on child soldiers by focusing on a narrow and incomplete 
understanding of children’s participation in armed conflicts. Rather, a multidimensional 
framework has to be developed to touch upon the various nuances and subtlety of this 
problematic. Thus, this chapter opened a dialogue between IHL, ICL and IHRL by 
underlining their shared principles and characteristics and by pointing out how such 
principles may be used as foundational norms in the design of a new framework which 
would also combined operational knowledge from armed forces such the Canadian Forces 
and its recent Joint Doctrine. This research project posited that such need for 
interdisciplinarity is justified by the massive and conflicting codification of the prohibition 
against children’s participation in hostilities by several areas of law, but also by the very 
specific status of children in international law. 
 Furthermore, this chapter addressed the flawed and narrow scope of IHL and ICL 
through their use of the terms ‘direct’ and ‘active’. Thus, it highlighted that the term ‘direct’ 
is inappropriate for the assessment of children’s participation due to lack of intent as a 
relevant constitutive element. In addition, it pointed out that ‘active’ participation, although 
allowing a larger prosecution of perpetrators using children in hostilities, is problematic 
due to the high and unclear threshold of ‘potential target’ and ‘real danger’ adopted by the 
ICC. As a matter of fact, this MRP demonstrated that treating children’s rights in a 
standardized and generic fashion as adults’ rights is a serious mistake, especially during 
the context of armed conflicts because the law exceptionally granted children with an 
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extensive protective legal regime (special protection), which applies to all children 
regardless of their conduct or status. 
 Thus, this project clarified that children, due to their vulnerabilities benefit from 
the maximum protection during hostilities. In fact, this project posited that every time that 
children’s interests are at stake, especially during armed conflicts, international law needs 
to adapt its methods to better reflect children’s vulnerabilities and lower maturity. 
Therefore, this MRP stated that children’s legal status during armed conflicts challenges 
IHL’s traditional principle of distinction and justifies a departure from the traditional 
concepts of ‘direct’ or ‘active’ participation, while calling for a new legal framework based 
on interdisciplinarity and military experience from armed forces. 
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Overall conclusion 
  
 The continuing practice of child soldiering constitutes a delicate issue in 
international politics where the morality and the law meet with economic, social, cultural, 
historical and political factors. This MRP highlighted that this interaction complicates the 
discussions on the required conditions and standards for the establishment of a strong and 
broad legal regime of protection of all children affected by armed conflicts, and especially 
those exploited and abused by armed groups such as child soldiers. 
 Despite its reluctance to tackle promptly the issue of child soldiers, Public 
International Law has progressively and massively codified the prohibition against child 
soldiering in several areas of law. Unfortunately, such massive codification, though 
positive for contributing to the increase of the awareness on the issue of child soldiering 
has created some ambiguity and uncertainty with respect to the exact scope of the 
prohibition against child soldiering since several and conflicting standards were adopted. 
 This MRP emphasized numerous gaps as to the issue of child soldiering such as the 
lack of a consensus on the meaning behind the term ‘child soldier’ and the inability to reach 
strong and shared standards of protection in international law. To improve child soldiers’ 
legal protection, this MRP proposed to consider child soldiers as children in terms of their 
rights and obligations, despite their conduct or status during hostilities. To assert that, this 
MRP discussed the definition of child soldiers and the nuances derived from soft law such 
as the Graça Machel report, the Cape Town Principles and the Paris Principle. All these 
instruments have successfully drawn the parameters of the issue of child soldiering through 
their inclusive definition and description of the context of child soldiering. This MRP noted 
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that these instruments, though not binding, have approached the analysis of the practice of 
child soldiering in very broad terms, thus illustrating that such issue cannot only be limited 
to the examination of military roles or to the rigid principle of distinction. As explained 
earlier, the Cape Town Principles have also recognized that child soldiers retain their status 
as children no matter what their conduct or status is during armed conflicts. This MRP 
argued that such important principle clarifies that child soldiers never lose their status and 
protection as children, despite their participation in hostilities.261 
 This MRP has also elaborated on the concept of children’s special protection which 
has been established to recognize children’s vulnerabilities and to protect them during 
extreme conditions of violence such as armed conflicts, where children cannot count on 
the usual protection and support of adults. Moreover, this project highlighted that the 
extension of such protection towards children who participate in hostilities is a clear 
indication that being involved in hostilities does not equate to lesser protection for children. 
Thus, this MRP argued that since child soldiers are entitled to the same special protection 
as child civilians, the elaboration of a new framework which deviates from IHL’s 
traditional principle of distinction is justified. 
 To that extent, this MRP argued that the category of child soldiers collapses these 
two categories (civilians and combatants) and requires its own framework and approach. 
To reach this conclusion, this MRP also examined the concept of ‘active’ and ‘direct’ 
participation following the ICRC’s guide on the notion of DPH and the ICC’s findings 
from the Lubanga case and it illustrated that both the ICRC and the ICC have failed to 
define children’s participation and to delineate the scope of the prohibition against the 
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practice of child soldiering. As explained earlier, the ICRC failed to do so by not 
considering the relevance of children’s lack of intent in the assessment of their 
participation, whereas the ICC designed a broad and ambiguous definition of ‘active’ 
participation, which instead of protecting child soldiers may place them in a more 
dangerous situation. 
 In addition, this MRP clarified that when there are children involved in armed 
conflicts, whether they are civilians or direct participants, IHL can never mechanically 
apply without consulting with IHRL principles such as children’s best interests and the 
military guidelines. This research project also evidenced that when some principles are 
designed to protect adults such as the principle of humanity or the principle of 
proportionality, they apply with even more power towards children.262 Therefore, this MRP 
posited that only a broader scope of analysis on the issue of child soldiers involving IHL, 
ICL, IHRL and military guidelines can help establish a stronger and more complete 
protection of child soldiers. Finally, this MRP agreed with military guidelines that when 
there is no other viable options, opposing forces can target child soldiers who are armed or 
who constitute a threat, with lethal or non-lethal forces although they should not have a 
“lethal intent”.263 
  This MRP supports that the law itself without military support cannot succeed in 
the eradication of the continuing practice of child soldiering. Lieutenant Colonel Leandro 
notes that “an essential aspect of dealing with child soldiering is indeed breaking the 
recruitment chain” although such task “is not a typical military function.”264 Similarly, the 
                                                     
262 Kuper, supra note 67 at 269. 
263 Leandro, supra note 7 at 6. 
264 Ibid at 9. 
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Canadian Forces JDN argues that there should be an “effort to break the cycle of 
exploitation and employment of children as child soldiers” which can take “a variety of 
roles, from supporting local organizations, NGOs, and IOs, to directly delivering 
information effects via military assets.”265 
 Thus, this MRP asserted that the issue of child soldiering is not limited to the legal 
question of the prohibition against their recruitment, enlistment, use or the modalities for 
targeting children involved armed conflicts, but also on how to put an end to the practice 
of child soldiering. It is clear that only the latter question will allow the design of an 
effective approach to tackle this alarming issue, especially with the current rise of terrorism 
and extremism around the world. 
 While this MRP makes a strong case for the strengthening of the legal protection 
of child soldiers during hostilities by using IHL, ICL, IHRL and soft law principles, there 
are some limitations to this project. As indicated in his title, this MRP focused its research 
on international law and did not study the principles and positions from domestic 
jurisdictions related to child soldiers. Such study would have required a distinct research 
and an informed selection of countries or regions to allow a comparison and a finding of 
some shared patterns. Such research is beyond the scope of this MRP. Furthermore, as 
confessed in its introduction, this MRP did not explore child soldiers’ criminal liabilities 
and it did not discuss the possibility to prosecute them when they become perpetrators. 
This is due to the fact that this project focused on child soldiers’ vulnerabilities and on the 
existing gaps related to their legal protection. Finally, due to its limited scope, this MRP 
did not clearly set out the underpinnings of the new framework of protection for child 
                                                     
265 Canadian Forces JDN supra note 8 at 2-11. 
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soldiers, and has briefly pointed out some major principles that would characterize such 
framework. 
 Future research may compare the position of domestic jurisdictions to the one of 
international courts and tribunals as to the issue of child soldiers’ criminal liability and 
vulnerabilities. For that purpose, it would be interesting to discuss the future findings of 
the Ongwen case266 in light of IHL, ICL and IHRL principles. 
  
                                                     
266 Ongwen supra note 6. This case represents the very first prosecution of a former child soldier at the 
International Criminal Court level. Its future finding may impact the understanding of the protection and 
criminal liability of child soldiers in international law. 
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